影视大全下载,448页通俄陈述出炉!美官方总结要点调查结果(之一),姚芊羽

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当地时刻4月18日周四上午,美国司法部揭露了“通俄门”特别查询组陈说的修订版全文。

“通俄门”查询由特别检察官穆勒主导,查询陈说分为上下两册,别离解说“勾通俄国”和“阻止司法”两个议题。司法部律师已隐去大陪审团材料、情报组织搜集的秘要信息、与正在影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽进行的查询有关的材料。

与此前现已发布过的四页司法部总结比较,这份长达448页的陈说全文供给了关于穆勒查询的更为丰厚的细节,被遮盖的内容也比此前外界意料的要少。

美国司法部长、共和党人威廉巴尔在周四的新闻发布会上称,“经过将近两年的查询、数千次传唤、数百个搜寻令和证人问询,特别检察官(穆勒)证明,俄罗斯政府赞助了干涉2016年美国总统大选的不合法行为,但没熊受罗宝春有发现特朗普的竞选团队或其他美国人与俄罗斯的行为进行勾通。”

陈说全文发布后,特朗普在推特上对穆勒进行了进犯。他发文称,穆勒长达22个月的查询是“有史以来最大的政治圈套”,是对“总统的打扰”。

最全国(ID:theveryworld)独家翻译了陈说的履行摘要部分。本篇为榜首部分,有关俄罗斯干涉美国大选和特朗普竞选团队与俄罗斯的联络。此外请留心最全国一起发布的陈说第二部分,有关特朗普是否阻止司法的查询。

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I

榜首卷履行摘要

RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

俄罗斯交际媒体运动

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation — a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States。 The IRA was based in St。 Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled。 Prigozhin is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering mission with instructions ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

查询能供认的最早的俄罗斯干涉行为由互联网研讨组织(IRA)所展开——这是一场旨在挑起和扩展美国政治和社会不好的交际媒体运动。IRA总部设在俄罗斯圣彼得堡,得到了俄罗斯寡头叶夫根尼普里戈津和他操控的公司的赞助。外界广泛报导称,普里戈津与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔普京存在联络,[删减]

2014年年中,IRA在[删减]的指示下将雇员派往美国履行情报搜集使命。

The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S。 political system through what it termed “information warfare。” The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S。 electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton, The IRA’s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the boyfunnames of U.S。 persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States。 To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S。 grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States。 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S。 persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA。 Section II of this report details the Office’s investigation of the Russian social media campaign。

后来,IRA运用交际媒体账户和利益集团,经过所谓的“信息战”在美国政治体系中制作不好。这项干涉活动在2014年和2015年是旨在损坏美国推举制度的抽象方案,到了2016年则演变成有利于提名人特朗普、降低提名人(希拉里)克林顿的有针对性的活动。IRA的行为还包含以美国个人和实体的名义在交际媒体上购买政治广告,以及在美国境内举办政治聚会。为了组织这些聚会,IRA职工假扮成美国底层的实体和个人,并与特朗普的支撑者和美国内特朗普竞选活动的官员进行了触摸。查询没有发现任何美国人与IRA共谋或协作的依据。本陈说第二节具体介绍了对俄罗斯交际媒体运动的查询状况。

RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS

俄罗斯黑客行为

At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign。 The Russian intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations。

在2016年头,IRA行为开端专心于支撑提名人特朗普的一起,俄罗斯政府采用了第二种方式的干涉:网络侵略(黑客),以及发布对克林顿竞选团队有害的,遭到黑客侵略的材料。俄罗斯情报部门,即俄罗斯陆军总参谋部情报总局(GRU,格鲁乌)展开了这些行为。

In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta。 In April 2016, the GRU hacked into the 简子涕泣computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC)。 The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks。 Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government’s role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas “DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0。” The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks The presidential campaign of Donald J。 Trump (“Trump Campaign” or “Campaign“) showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases of documents and welcomed their potential to damage candidate Clinton。 Beginning in June 2016, ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton。 WikiLeaks’s first release came in July 2016。 Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server used by Clinton when she was Secretary of State (he later said tha影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽t he was speaking sarcastically)。

2016年3月,GRU开端侵入克林顿竞选团队志愿者和职工的电子邮件账户,其间包含竞选团队主席约翰波德斯塔。2016年4月,GRU侵入了民主党国会竞选委员会和民主党全国委员会的计算机网络。GRU从遭侵略的电子邮件账户和网络中盗取了数十万份文档。2016年6月中旬,民主党全国委员会揭露俄罗斯政府在黑客行为中扮演的人物前后,GRU开端经过虚拟的在线人物“DCLeaks”和“Guccifer 2.0”传达被盗材料。GRU后来经过维基解密发布了更多材料。维基解密称,特朗普的总统竞选团队(即“特朗普竞选团队”或“竞选团队”)对维基解密发布的文件表现出爱好,并对这些文件有或许危害提名人克林顿标明欢迎。从2016年6月开端,[删减]向高档竞选官员猜测,维基解密将发布对提名人克林顿有害的信息。维基解密的榜初次发布是在2016年7月。大约在同一时刻,提名人特朗普宣告,他期望俄罗斯能从克林顿担任国务卿期间运用的一台私家服务器上康复听说现已丢掉的电子邮件(他后来标明自己只是在挖苦)。

■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta’s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S。 media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump。 Section III of this Report details the Office’s investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails。

[删减]维基解密于10月7日开端发布波德斯塔被盗的电子邮件。而就在不到一小时前,一家美国媒体发布了被以为对提名人特朗普有害的视频。本陈说第三节具体介绍了对俄罗斯黑客行为的查询,以及特朗普竞选团队支撑者为获取与克林顿有关的电子邮件所做的其他尽力。

RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN

俄罗斯与竞选的联络

The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government。 The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities。 Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities。

交际媒体运动和GRU的黑客行为,与特朗普竞选团队官员和一些与俄罗斯政府有相关的个人之间的一系列触摸一起发生。(特别检察官)办公室查询了这些触摸是否反映或导致了与俄罗斯共谋或协作干涉推举活动的运动。虽然查询供认,俄罗斯政府信任自己将从特朗普担任总统的过程中获益,并尽力保证这一成果;并且特朗普竞选团队估计,经过俄罗斯的尽力,他们将从被盗取和发布的信息中取得推举上的利益。但查询并未供认特朗普竞选团队的成员与俄罗斯政府在其推举干涉活动中共谋或协作。

The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved U.S。-Russian relations。 Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order。

与俄罗斯的触摸包含商业联络、向竞选活动供给援助、约请提名人特朗普和普京接见接见会面、约请竞选官员和俄罗斯政府代表接见接见会面,以及寻求改进美俄联络的方针态度。本陈说第四节具体介绍了俄罗斯与特朗普竞选团队在竞选和过渡期间的触摸,其间最杰出的部分按时刻次序概述如下:

2015。 Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow。 Candidate Trump signed a Letter of Intent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary Dmitry Peskov。 The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump。

2015年 最早的一些触摸与特朗普集团在俄罗斯的一个房地产项目—莫斯科特朗普大厦有关。提名人特朗普在2015年11月之前签署了一份莫斯科特朗普大厦的意向书,2016年1月,特朗普集团高管迈克尔科恩经过电子邮件与俄罗斯政府新闻秘书德米特里佩斯科夫的办公室议论了该项目。特朗普集团至少在2016年6月依然推进了该项目,包含考虑让科恩和提名人特朗普前往俄罗斯的方案。

Spring 2016。 Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016。 Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had “dir幽异女学生t” on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands of emails。 One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton。 Throughout that period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government。 No meeting took place。、

2016年春 竞选外交方针参谋乔治帕帕佐普洛斯早些时候与约瑟夫米夫苏德进行了触摸。米夫苏德是一名在伦敦的教授,与俄罗斯有联络,并于2016年4月前往莫斯科。米夫苏德完毕那次拜访回到伦敦后就当即通知帕帕佐普洛斯,俄罗斯政府能够凭数千封电子邮件向希拉里克林顿“泼脏水”。一周后,也便是2016年5月的榜首周,帕帕佐普洛斯向一位外国政府代表暗示,特朗普竞选团队现已从俄罗斯政府那里取得了暗示,标明他们能够匿名发布对提名人克林顿有害的信息来帮忙竞选活动。在这期间和尔后的几个月里,帕帕佐普洛斯与米夫苏德和两名俄罗斯国民协作,组织竞选团队与俄罗斯政府之间的接见接见会面。但没有接见接见会面举办。

Summer 2016。 Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump冯国辉 was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President。 On June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr。, Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing the meeting had described as “official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary。” The materials were offered to Trump Jr。 as “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr。 Trump。” The written communications setting up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist candidate Trump’s electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer’s presentation did not provide such information。

2016年夏天 俄罗斯与特朗普竞选团队的触摸一向继续到2016年夏天,那时提名人特朗普已被看好将成为共和党的总统提名人。例如,2016年6月9日,一名俄罗斯律师会见了特朗普竞选团队的高档官员小唐纳德特朗普、贾里德库什纳和竞选主席保罗马纳福特,供给了提议接见会面的电子邮件所称的“将希拉里科罪的官方文件和信息”。这些材料是供给给小特朗普的,作为“俄罗斯及其政府对特朗普支撑的一部分”。组织会议的书面交流记载显现,竞选团队估计会收到俄罗斯供给的信息,这些信息或许有助于提名人特朗普的推举远景,但俄罗斯律师的陈说没有供给此类信息。

Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents。 In July 2016, Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School。 Page had lived and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007。 After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with conspiracy to act as an unregis万能高手李怀风tered agent of Russia。 Page’s July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention。 The Campaign then distanced itself from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign。

在2016年6月9日的会议几天后,2016年6月14日,一家网络安全公司和民主党全国委员会宣告,俄罗斯政府黑客侵入了民主党全国委员会的体系,并取得了对提名人特朗普的对立态度研讨以及其他文件。2016年7月,竞选外交方针参谋卡特佩奇以个人身份前往莫斯科,并在新经济学院宣告了宗旨讲演。佩奇在2003年至2007年期间曾在俄罗斯日子和作业。回到美国后,佩奇结识了至少两名俄罗斯情报官员,其间一人后来在2015年被指控作为俄罗斯的未注册奸细犯下共谋罪。佩奇2016年7月对莫斯科的拜访和他对亲俄外交方针的宣扬引起了媒体的重视。随后,竞选团队与佩奇逐步疏远,到2016年9月底,佩奇被逐出竞选团队。

July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the DNC。 On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of in影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽ternal DNC documents revealing information about the Clinton Campaign。 Within days, there was public reporting that U.S。 intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC。 And within a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign。 On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign government reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign。

2016年7月也是维基解密初次发布GRU从民主党全国委员会盗取的电子邮件的月份。2016年7月22日,维基解密发布了数千份民主党全国委员会内部文件,发表了克林顿竞选团队的信息。几天内,就有揭露报导称,美国情报组织“高度信任”俄罗斯政府是从民主党全国委员会盗取电子邮件和文件的暗地黑手。在信息揭露后的一周内,一个外国政府向FBI通报了2016年5月与帕帕佐普洛斯的互动,以及他关于俄罗斯政府能够帮忙特朗普竞选的声明。2016年7月31日,依据外国政府的陈说,联邦查询局对俄罗斯政府与特朗普竞选团队相关个人之间的潜在协作展开了查询。

Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence。 Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel’s Office was a “backdoor”阿曼苏尔之眼 way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump’s assent to succeed (were he to be elected President)。 They also discussed the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states。 Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting。

别的,2016年8月2日,特朗普竞选团队主席保罗马纳福特在纽约市会见了他的长时间商业伙伴康斯坦丁基利姆尼克。联邦查询局评价,基利姆尼克与俄罗斯情报部门有联络。基利姆尼克要求会议亲身提交一份乌克兰平和方案,马纳福特向特别检察官办公室供认,这是俄罗斯操控乌克兰东部部分区域的“后备方案”;两人都以为,该方案需求得到提名人特朗普的赞同(假如他中选总统)才干取得成功。他们还评论了特朗普竞选团队的现状以及马纳福特提出的在中西部各州争夺民主党选票的战略。在那次会议之前几个月,马纳福特已将内部投票数据与基利姆尼克共享,并在8月会议之后的一段时刻内继续进行共享。

Fall 2016。 On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽 women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy。 Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta’s emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016。 The FBI and other U.S。 gove狂蟒行为rnment institutions were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in the presidential election。 That same day, October 7, the De滋尔滨partment of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement “that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations。” Those “thefts” and the “disclosures” of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, “are intended to interfere with the US election process。”

2016年秋季 2016年10月7日,媒体发布了提名人特朗普多年前有板有眼地议论女人的视频,这被以为对他的竞选远景形成危害。不到一小时后,维基解密再次发布了一系列文件:2016年3月下旬被GRU盗取的数千封约翰波德斯塔的电子邮件。其时,联邦查询局和其他美国政府组织正在查询俄罗斯政府涉嫌干涉总统推举的行为。同一天,即10月7日,疆土安全部和国家情报总监办公室宣告了一项联合揭露声明,“即俄罗斯政府指示了最近对美国个人和组织,包含美国政治组织的电子邮件的盗取”。声明还说,这些“偷盗”和经过维基解密等在线渠道“发表”被黑客进犯的材料,“都是为了搅扰美国的推举进程”。

Post-2016 Election。 Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government offici簿本下载als and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new administration。 The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts。 The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin。 Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there。

2016年大选后 在11月8日的推举之后,俄罗斯政府官员和闻名俄罗斯商人当即企图触摸新政府。俄罗斯政府最高层也鼓舞这些尽力。俄罗斯大使馆在推举后几个小时进行了触摸,向新中选总统标明祝贺,并组织与普京总统通话。几个俄罗斯商人在那里接过了这项作业。

Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, was among the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration。 In early December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the T影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽rump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon。 Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S。-Russia relations。 During the same period, another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on the Campaign or the Transition Team。 Dmitriev and Kushner’s friend collaborated on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin。 The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Ban锐哥好美non and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson。

俄罗斯主权财富基金首席履行官基里尔德米特里耶夫是企图与新一届政府触摸的俄罗斯人之一。12月初,一位商业伙伴带领德米特里耶夫去见埃里克普林斯,他是特朗普竞选的支撑者,也是特朗普高档参谋史蒂夫班农的帮手。德米特里耶夫和普林斯随后于2017年1月在塞舌尔面对面接见接见会面,评论了美俄联络。在同一时期,另一名商业伙伴将德米特里耶夫介绍给库什纳的一位朋友,这位朋友没有在竞选或过渡团队中任职。德米特里耶夫和库什纳的朋友协作为美国和俄罗斯拟定了一份简略的书面宽和方案,德米特里耶夫暗示,该方案现已过普京赞同。这位朋友在就职典礼前向库什纳递交了这份提案,库什纳后来将副本交给了班农和行将就任的国务卿雷克斯蒂勒森。

On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election。 Incoming Nation毒魂护腿al Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the sanctions。 The影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽 following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time。 Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, “Great move on delay (by V。 Putin)。” The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result of Flynn’s request。

2016年12月29日,时任总统的奥巴马对干涉推举的俄罗斯施行了制裁。新任国家安全参谋迈克尔弗林致电俄罗斯大使谢尔盖基斯利亚克,要求俄罗斯不要因制裁而晋级形势。第二天,普京宣告,俄罗斯不会对其时的制裁采用报复办法。几个小时后,中选总统特朗普在Twitter上写道,“(普京)巨大的延期行为“。第二天,2016年12月31日,基斯利亚克打电话给弗林,通知他最高层现已收到了这一恳求,俄罗斯挑选依照弗林的恳求不进行报复。

On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment — drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security Agency — that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means to assist Trump’s candidacy and harm Clinton’s。 A declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day。

2017年1月6日,情报界成员向中选总统特朗普扼要介绍了一项联合评价——由中央情报局、联邦查询局和国家安全局起草和和谐——评价的结论是,俄罗斯经过各种手法干涉推举,以帮忙特朗普竞选,并危害克林顿的竞选远景。该评价的解密版别在同一天揭露发布。

Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees — the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) — announced that they would conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the election。 Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI’s investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election。 On March 20, 2017, in open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated:

2017年1月中旬至2017年2月初,三个国会委员会——众议院常设情报特别委员会、参议院情报特设委员会和参议院司法委员会宣告,它们将对俄罗斯干涉推举进行查询,或现已在进行查询。其时的联邦查询局局长詹姆斯科米后来向国会证明,联邦查询局对俄罗斯干涉的查询是在推举前开端的。2017年3月20日,科米在向众议院常设情报特别委员会揭露作证时指出:

I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts。 。。。 As with any counterintell逝世紫灵天使igence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed。

司法部授权我供认,作为咱们反情报使命的一部分,联邦查询局正在查询俄罗斯政府干涉2016年总统推举的尽力,其间包含查询与特朗普竞选团队和俄罗斯政府有相关的个人之间的任何联络,以及竞选活动和俄罗斯的行为之间是否存在任何和谐行为。与任何反情报查询相同,这也将包含对是否犯下任何罪过进行评价。

The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9, 2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Dire数码宝贝linkzctor — an action which is analyzed in Volume II of the report。

On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R。 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the investigation。

在接下来的七周里,查询在其时的科米局长的领导下继续进行,直到2017年5月9日特朗普总统辞退了科米——这一行为在陈说的第二卷中进行了剖析。

2017年5月17日,署理总检察长罗德罗森斯坦录用了特别检察官,并授权他查询科米在国会证词中供认的内容,还有由查询直接发生的事项,以及“联邦最高法院判例汇编”第28编第600.4(A)节范围内的任何其他事项,其间一般包含搅扰或阻止查询的尽力。

THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S CHARGING DECISIONS

特别检察官的指控决议

In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report, the Office determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution。 See Justice Manual 9-27.000 et seq。 (2018)。 The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if So, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives。 See Justice Manual 9-27.220。

在作出陈说榜首卷所述的指控决议时,检察官办公室供认其确认的行为是否违背了依据“联邦检察机关准则”应申述的联邦刑法。详见“司法手册”9-27.000及这以后。(2018)。“司法手册”规则的标准是,该行为是否构成犯罪;假如构成犯罪,可采用的依据是否或许足以取得和保持科罪;以及申述是否契合联邦的严重利益,并且其他申述或经过非刑事的代替手法不能充沛满意这一利益。详见“司法手册”9-27.220。

Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office’s charging decisions, which contain three main components。

First, the Office determined that Russia’s two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S。 presidential election — the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations — violated U.S。 criminal law。 Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social枫哀 media camp渡辰意迟生aign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S。 elections, as well as related counts of identity theft。 See United States v。 Internet Research Agency, et al。, No。 18-cr-32 (D.D.C。)。 Separately, Russian intelligence officers who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws, the federal computer-intrusion statute, and they have been so charged。 See United States v。 Netyksho, et al。, No。 18-cr-215 (D.D.C。)。

陈说第五节具体解说了该办公室的指控决议,其间包含三个首要部分。

首要,该办公室确认,俄罗斯在2016年美国总统大选中的两项首要干涉行为—交际媒体运动,以及黑客行为—违背了美国刑法。参加这场交际媒体运动的许多个人和实体被指控参加了诈骗美国的共谋罪,他们经过诈骗性行为损坏了联邦组织的作业,这些组织首要担任监管外国在美国推举中的影响力,以及相关的身份盗用罪名。详见 United States v。 Internet Research Agency, et al。, No。 18-cr-32 (D.D.C。)et al。,No.18-cr-32(D.C。)。别的,对民主党电脑和与克林顿竞选有相关的个人电子邮件账户施行黑客进犯的俄罗斯情报官员,除其他联邦法令外,还合谋违背了联邦计算机侵略法规,他们也遭到考逼了相应指控。详见United States v.Netyksho,et al。,No.18-cr-215(D.C。)。

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Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal charges。 Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian principal。 And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks’s releases of hacked materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation.1 Further, the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election。

[删减]其次,虽然查询发现与俄罗斯政府有联络的个人与特朗普竞选团队有相关,但依据不足以支撑刑事指控。除其他外,依据不足以指控任何竞选官员为俄罗斯政府的未注册署理人或其他俄罗斯委托人。并且,咱们关于2016年6月9日会议和维基解密发布的被黑客进犯的材料的依据,不足以指控违背竞选资金规则的犯罪过为。此外,这些依据不足以指控特朗普竞选团队的任何成员与俄罗斯政府代表合谋干涉2016年的推举。

Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated individuals and related matters。 Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian election interference。 The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false-statements statute。 Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period。 George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails。 Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Moscow project。

第三,查询供认,与特朗普竞选团队有相关的几名个人在与俄罗斯相关个人的互动和相关事项上,向美国国家安全局和国会说谎。这些谎话极大地危害了对俄罗斯干涉推举的查询。该办公室指控其间一些谎话违背了联邦虚伪陈说法规。前国家安全参谋迈克尔弗林供认,他在过渡时期与俄罗斯大使基斯利亚克互动的徐大宝事上说谎。乔治帕帕佐普洛斯是竞选期间的一名外交方针参谋,他供认在与约瑟夫米夫苏德互动的性质和机遇等问题上向查询人员说谎。米夫苏德教授通知帕帕佐普洛斯,俄罗斯以数千封电子邮件的方式把握了提名人克林顿的丑闻。特朗普集团前律师迈克尔科恩供认就特朗普的莫斯科项目向国会作出了虚伪陈说。

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[删减]在2019年2月,美国哥伦比亚特区区域法院发现,马纳福特在与康斯坦丁基利姆尼克就特朗普竞选团队投票数据和乌克兰平和方案进行互动和交流的问题上,对办公室和大陪审团撒了谎。

The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve potential Russia-related contacts。 For example, the investigation established that interactions between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate’s April 2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C。, and during the week of the Republican National Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive。 And the investigation did not establish that one Campaign official’s efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia。 The investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 2016 at Sessions’s Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential campaign。

特别检察官办公室查询了其他几起据揭露报导触及与俄罗斯有关的潜在触摸的事情。例如,查询供认,俄罗斯大使基斯利亚克和特朗普竞选团队官员在2016年4月华盛顿特区的外交方针讲演上,以及共和党举办代表大会的那一周进行了简略、揭露和非实质性的触摸。并且,查询并未证明,一名竞选官员企图淡化共和党关于向乌克兰供给援助的部分纲要,是应提名人特朗普或俄罗斯的要求进行的。查询一起无法供认,在基斯利亚克和塞申斯于2016年9月在塞申斯的参议院办公室举办的会议,除了趁便说到总统竞选之外,还说到了其他内容。

The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation。 Some individuals invo安仔包子加盟ked their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office’s judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity。 The Office limited its pursuit of other witnes影视大全下载,448页通俄陈说出炉!美官方总结关键查询成果(之一),姚芊羽ses and information — such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be members of the media — in light of internal Department of Justice policies。 See, e.g。, Justice Manual 9-13.400, 13.410。 Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or “taint”) team。 Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges described above。 And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well — numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United States。

查询并不总是能供给可承受的信息或证词,也不能全面了解查询目标所展开的活动。一些个人征引“第五修正案”规则的权力,对立逼迫自证其罪,依据办公室的判别,他们不是取得豁免的恰当提名人。检察官办公室依据司法部的内部方针,遏止了对其他证人和信息的追寻,例如律师或声称是媒体成员的个人所知的信息,详见“司法手册”9-13.400,13.410。此外,经过法院程序取得的一些信息被推定包含在法令特权范围内,并由一个过滤(或“污点”)小组对查询人员进行挑选。即便在个人作证或赞同承受面谈时,他们有时也会供给虚伪或不完好的信息,导致上文所述的一些虚伪陈说指控。此外,检察官办公室在获取相关依据的才能方面也面对实践约束——许多证人和涉案人员日子在国外,文件也被保存在美国境外。

Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct we investigated — including some associated with the Trump Campaign-deleted relevant communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records。 In such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared inconsistent with other known facts。

Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps, the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report。

此外,办公室了解到,咱们采访的一些人或咱们查询的一些人——包含一些与特朗普竞选有关的人——删除了相关通讯,或在有关时刻段运用具有加密功用或不能长时间保存数据或通讯记载的应用程序进行通讯。在这种状况下,检察官办公室无法经过其时的交流内容来证明证人的陈说,也无法就与其他已知现实不符的陈说向证人提出充沛的问题。

因而,虽然本陈说表现了检察官办公室以为尽或许精确和完好的现实和法令裁决,但鉴于这些已查明的距离,检察官办公室不能扫除这样一种或许性:即未能得到的材料将对陈说中所述的事情供给额定或全新的阐明。

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